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Over the last 30 to 40 years, sweeping changes haveoccurred in societal attitudes toward divorce.  Thesechanges have been reflected in the laws governing
divorce and child custody as well as in the increasing rate of
divorce in the United States.  Just as divorce laws have changed,
making the divorce process much less difficult, there have also
been dramatic changes in custody and visitation statutes.  From
the mid-1800s until the 1960s, maternal preference was the
general rule in the large majority of judicial custody decisions.
During this period, the mother’s “natural  ability” to nurture the
child was considered as a primary factor in custody decisions.
This attitude was especially prominent with regard to younger
children or children of the “tender years.”  This “tender years
doctrine” developed in some jurisdictions through legislation
and in others through judicial opinion.  Reference was fre-
quently made in judicial opinions to the mother’s “natural supe-
riority” in caring for children.  There was little public contro-
versy regarding this attitude since it seemed to reflect societal
values at that time.  Thus, from the second half of the nine-
teenth century until the 1960s, legal norms dictated that cus-
tody of children belonged with the mother unless she was inca-
pable of providing appropriate care, usually due to mental ill-
ness or moral depravity as evidenced by adultery.1 A finding of
inability to care for the children was usually related to a finding
of fault in the divorce proceedings.
In the 1950s and 1960s, there was a subtle shift in the ten-
der years doctrine and maternal preference.  Less emphasis was
being placed on the mother’s natural superiority in judicial
opinions.  The courts began to emphasize the “best interests of
the child,” giving more discretion to judges to consider other
factors in custody decisions.  In many jurisdictions, however,
“the best interests of the child” standard was simply another
name for the “tender years doctrine” since most courts held
that maternal custody was usually in the best interests of the
child.  This shift in legal thought, however, did open the door
for the consideration of other factors.  This situation resulted in
slightly more frequent assignment of custody to fathers
although this shift was far from substantial.2
In the 1970s, social attitudes were again shifting.  The pref-
erence for maternal custody was being questioned on several
fronts.  More and more women were entering the workforce as
both part-time and full-time employees.  Thus, differences
between men and women were being reduced with regard to
their roles in the family.  In addition, the feminist movement
was questioning the assumption that only women could do
housework and raise children.  As a result, fathers were becom-
ing more involved in the parenting process at the same time
that divorce was becoming more frequent.  During this period,
two opposing positions were often considered by the courts
when determining the best interests of the child with regard to
custody decisions.  According to the traditional viewpoint, chil-
dren need a stable home life and, therefore, should not be shut-
tled back and forth from parent to parent on a regular basis.
The parent with whom the child lives should have almost
exclusive responsibility for raising the child, with only occa-
sional visitation with the noncustodial parent.  This position,
which had been used for many years, was supported by many
mental health professionals at the time and was reflected in the
book entitled Beyond the Best Interests of the Child by Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit.3 Goldstein et al. also held that there should
be no court-ordered visitation and that visitation with the non-
custodial parent should be solely at the discretion of the custo-
dial parent.  This publication was frequently cited in judicial
decisions as well as in the legal literature.
The alternative viewpoint, which was emerging in the 1970s,
reflected parental desires for joint custody or a more equal shar-
ing of time with and responsibility for the children following
divorce.  This position reflected changing middle-class lifestyles
as well as demands from fathers’ groups for more active partic-
ipation in the parenting process.  As a result of pressure from
parents’ groups, joint custody legislation was passed rather
quickly and with little public opposition in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.  This legislation provided equal access to children
for both mothers and fathers.  At about the same time, states
were also passing gender neutral custody legislation, which
eliminated maternal preferences and the tender years doctrine.
There was a great deal of opposition to joint custody in the legal
and, to a lesser extent, the mental health communities.  As indi-
cated above, this approach ran counter to the opinions of some
in the mental health community.  There was also a great deal of
resistance from both attorneys and judges since joint custody
represented a dramatic change in the traditional approach to
this situation.4
At the present time, all states have provisions for gender
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neutral custody laws and joint custody arrangements.  Since
maternal custody is no longer automatic, and distinctions
between maternal and paternal roles have been blurred over the
past 30 years, judges must now consider a number of issues that
were not relevant in the past.  There has been a great deal of
speculation in the legal literature, however, that many judges
still have a preference for maternal custody.5
In approximately 90% of divorces involving minor children,
the parents reach  agreement on custody and visitation arrange-
ments.  This agreement is then approved by the court.  In the
remaining 10% of the cases, custody is contested and the deci-
sion must be made by the court.  Judges are expected to make
their decisions in the best interests of the child.  This standard,
however, gives judges a tremendous amount of discretion in
making these decisions.  Clearly, every judge has his or her own
set of opinions and presumptions regarding custody issues,
which affect rulings.  A number of authors have suggested that
judges are frequently free to impose their own personal values
due to the indeterminacy of the substantive standards that apply
in custody decisions.6 These conclusions are based primarily
on case law.  Case law itself, however, is not necessarily repre-
sentative of judicial attitudes in general, since published cases
represent only a small minority of actual decisions.    
Judges’ assumptions regarding various issues related to cus-
tody decisions have been assessed through the use of judicial
surveys in research done by the present author.  In one study,
Louisiana judges’ preferences for various custody and visitation
arrangements, as well as some of the factors considered in these
decisions, were examined.7 A similar study was completed with
Quebec Superior Court judges.8 In a third study, a variety of
issues dealing with Louisiana judges’ attitudes regarding cus-
tody issues were examined.9
THE SURVEY OF JUDGES
The purpose of the present study was to further assess judi-
cial assumptions regarding custody decisions, specifically as
they relate to the maternal preference issue.  Several authors
have suggested that maternal preference may still be the rule in
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many courts, with children of most ages, but especially when
children of the “tender years” (young children) are involved, in
spite of gender neutral custody laws in all jurisdictions.10 This
type of presumption could be justified if the judge assumes that
mothers are superior to fathers as parents, especially with
younger children.  Thus, given this assumption, it would be in
the child’s best interests to be placed in the custody of the
mother.  The impact of the age of the judge was also assessed in
the present research.  It was hypothesized that older judges may
be more inclined to favor maternal preference, while younger
judges may tend to view mothers and fathers on a more equal
basis.
In the present study, judges hearing custody cases in
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee were surveyed
by mail.  The number of judges responding in each age bracket
was as follows:
30-39 5
40-49 60
50-59 47
60-69 26
70-79 7
No age listed 4
Because of the small numbers in the 30-39 and 70-79 brack-
ets, they were excluded from the analysis.  A list of items was
constructed to measure the judges’ beliefs with regard to mater-
nal preference in custody decisions.  The judges were asked to
respond to each item on a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 indicating
“Strongly Agree” and 5 indicating “Strongly Disagree.”  These
items, shown below, were grouped into five pairs, with one item
of each pair referring to the mother and an identical item refer-
ring to the father.  The results were evaluated by examining the
distribution of the judges’ responses, divided by age groups.  In
the following tabulation, judges’ responses of 1 or 2 were listed
under “Agree,” and responses of 4 or 5 were listed under
“Disagree.”  Responses of 3 were considered “Neutral” or
“Undecided” and were not listed below.  The numbers under
each category indicate the percentage of judges who gave that
response.  
A response of “Agree” to the “a” version of each item above
indicates a preference for the mother, while a response of
“Agree” to the “b” version indicates a preference for the father.
The reverse holds with regard to the “Disagree” category.  A
response of “Disagree” to the “a” version indicates a preference
for the father while a response of “Disagree” to the “b” version
indicates a preference for the mother.  
When examining the “Agree” column for items 1-4, the
results show far more “Agree” responses for mothers than for
fathers, which is indicative of a fairly consistent tendency
toward maternal preference by the judges.  There is also a defi-
nite pattern showing stronger signs of maternal preference with
older judges, compared to younger judges.  Some of these find-
ings are highlighted in the following paragraphs.
ITEM NO. AGE AGREE DISAGREE
1.a. Mothers are better  40-49 14 45
parents than fathers 50-59 21 32
due to more experience 60-69 28 24
raising children.
1.b. Fathers are better 40-49 0 63
parents than mothers 50-59 0 76
due to more experience 60-69 0 71
raising children.
2.a. Mothers are the 40-49 36 26
preferred custodian 50-59 35 31
when children are under 60-69 71 4
the age of 6.
2.b. Fathers are the 40-49 0 56
preferred custodian 50-59 1 66
when children are under 60-69 1 68
the age of 6.  
3.a. Children of all ages show 40-49 3 49
better adjustment when 50-59 10 39
living with the mother. 60-69 16 20
3.b. Children of all ages show 40-49 0 52
better adjustment when 50-59 0 66
living with the father. 60-69 0 63
4.a. Mothers, by nature, 40-49 5 39
make better parents 50-59 28 38
than fathers. 60-69 46 17
4.b. Fathers, by nature, 40-49 0 68
make better parents     50-59 6 70
than mothers. 60-69 0 84
5.a. A mother who has 40-49 97 3 
performed most of the 50-59 85 7
child’s nurturing and 60-69 96 0
maintenance activities   
would be favored in 
custody decisions.
5.b. A father who has 40-49 95 0 
performed most of the 50-59 90 2
child’s nurturing and 60-69 81 4
maintenance activities
would be favored in 
custody decisions.
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In examining Item 1, the percentage of judges agreeing that
mothers are better parents than fathers due to greater experi-
ence, increases as the age of the judge increases.  The percent-
age of judges disagreeing with the statement decreases as the
age of the judge decreases.  None of the judges felt that fathers
were better parents than mothers due to greater experience.  
Item 2 deals with the tender years doctrine, regarding cus-
tody of younger children.  The percentage of judges agreeing
that mothers are the preferred custodians of younger children
increased dramatically with the age of the judge, with 36% of
the youngest judges agreeing and 71% of the oldest judges
agreeing.  Only 2% of the judges in the entire sample felt that
fathers are the preferred custodians for younger children.
On Item 3, only a small minority of judges agreed that chil-
dren show better adjustment while living with the mother.
Even on this item, however, the percentage agreeing was great-
est for the oldest judges.  None of the judges agreed that chil-
dren showed better adjustment while living with the father.  
On Item 4, the judges were asked whether fathers or moth-
ers made better parents.  With regard to mothers, there was a
definite age trend, with only 5% of the youngest judges agree-
ing that mothers make better parents than fathers, while 46% of
the oldest judges agreed with that statement.  Only 6% of the
entire sample agreed that fathers make better parents than
mothers, with no age differences evident.
Item 5 deals with the primary caretaker standard.  Judges
were asked if the parent who had performed most of the child’s
care-taking activities would be favored in custody decisions.
The judges in all age groups overwhelmingly agreed, whether
that parent was the mother or father.  Even on this Item, how-
ever, there was a slight tendency toward maternal preference
among the oldest age group.  When the question referred to a
mother who had done most of the care-taking activities for the
child, 96% of the oldest judges agreed that she would be favored
in custody decisions.  When the same question referred to a
father who had done most of the child care, only 81% of the
oldest judges agreed that the father would be favored in the cus-
tody decision.  
The findings of maternal preference in the present study are
consistent with various reviews of appellate cases as well as the
opinions of a number of professionals in both the mental health
and legal fields, all of which indicate that maternal preference
still plays a definite role in many custody determinations.  For
example, Melton et al. concluded that maternal preference still
remains the norm in many jurisdictions, after reviewing appel-
late decisions in South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.11
Emery described maternal preference as one of the  “unarticu-
lated values,” “implicit norms,” or “rules of thumb” used in
many jurisdictions to guide judicial decisions in custody
cases.12 Dotterweich and McKinney reviewed state bar associa-
tion studies of gender bias from Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and
Washington.  In summarizing the results of surveys of judges in
these states, they concluded that maternal preference is still
common among judges.  On one item used in these surveys,
judges were asked “Are custody awards made based on the
assumption that young children belong with their mothers?”
The results indicated that 44% of the judges answered “Always
or Usually” indicating support for the tender years doctrine and
maternal preference by almost half of the judges.  Item 2 in the
present study dealt with the same issue, with 42% of all judges
agreeing that children under the age of 6 should be with their
mothers.  Dotterweich and McKinney also reported that judges
were asked, “Do courts give fair consideration to fathers?”
Thiry-three percent of the judges answered “Always or Usually,”
indicating that two-thirds of the judges believed that fathers do
not usually get fair consideration in the courts.13
These types of assumptions held by judges often seem con-
sistent with certain societal norms.  In many groups within the
United States, there is still a strong belief that mothers should
raise the children, while the role of the fathers should be sec-
ondary.     
The fact that older judges exhibit a greater tendency toward
maternal preference seems to make intuitive sense.  Since
judges are given a great deal of latitude in deciding that which
is in the best interests of the child, it does not seem unusual that
a judge’s personal experiences and beliefs may play a role in
those decisions regarding child custody.  Judges who are cur-
rently in their 60s would have grown up primarily during the
1930s and 1940s when divorce was rare and family roles were
fixed, with mothers caring for children and doing housework,
while fathers were employed to provide income for the families.
The beliefs that children belonged with the mother were widely
accepted within American society during that era and were also
reflected in court cases at that time.  These attitudes regarding
family roles, established during childhood, and reinforced by
society in general at the time, are difficult to change later in life.
Judges who are currently in their 40s and 50s grew up pri-
marily during the 1950s to 1970s.  That time in our history
was a period of dramatic cultural change, with many women
entering the work force, resulting in drastic changes in family
structure and roles.  The divorce rate also increased dramati-
cally, with many children living in single-parent homes. Many
of these judges have had firsthand experience with working
mothers, fathers taking an active role in child care, single-par-
ent homes, and a general blurring of the roles between men
and women.  
A judge could justify this belief of maternal preference if
he/she believed that mothers, in general, are better parents than
fathers and that awarding custody to the mother is usually in
the best interests of the child. This belief appears to be preva-
lent among a substantial proportion of judges both in the pre-
sent study as well as in other studies.  Although mothers are the
primary custodial parent in 80% to 85% of all divorces involv-
ing children, the psychological literature indicates that chil-
dren’s overall adjustment following divorce does not differ
between those living with custodial mothers versus custodial
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fathers.  This finding holds true even with infants and young
children.14 Thus, the research literature does not appear to sup-
port the presumption that maternal preference is usually in the
best interests of the child.  Given the findings of equal parent-
ing abilities for mothers and fathers, it would seem that the best
interests of the child would be served through a gender neutral
assessment of the family as called for in state laws. 
CONCLUSIONS
Judges’ attitudes and opinions can affect custody arrange-
ments in a number of ways.  The most obvious impact occurs in
contested cases when judges must make the final decisions,
based on the information presented to the court.  Judges’ atti-
tudes can also have an impact on the process outside of the
courtroom.  Approximately 90% of custody matters are settled
before the parents come to court.  Although these arrangements
are considered voluntary, the negotiations are always completed
in the context of that which is permitted within the legal system,
or as Mnookin and Kornhauser have described, “Bargaining in
the shadow of the law.”15 A more accurate description might be
“bargaining in the shadow of the law and the judges’ assump-
tions.”  Thus, if an attorney is aware of the attitudes of a partic-
ular judge or a group of judges regarding various custody-related
issues, this information will have a very definite impact upon the
advice that is given to the client with regard to decisions either
to reach an agreement out of court or continue through the legal
process in which a judge will make the custody decision.  It has
even been suggested that a judge’s known attitudes may affect
the recommendations of court-ordered custody investigations
by mental health professionals, as the investigator sometimes
tries to present recommendations that are consistent with a
judge’s previous rulings.16 Thus, the attitudes of a judge can
reach well beyond the decisions that are actually made by the
court in disputed cases. 
The indeterminancy of statutes dealing with divorce and
custody issues allows the judiciary a great deal of flexibility in
dealing with the widely varying circumstances of individual
families.  At the same time, this flexibility places tremendous
responsibility upon the court to define the “best interests” for a
given family.  The manner in which a particular judge may
define “best interests” will depend on the assumptions that the
judge is making about child development and parent-child rela-
tionships.  These assumptions may be based on information
from various sources.  These sources may include the judge’s
own family experiences, going back to his or her own child-
hood, the judge’s experience as a parent, “common sense”
derived from a variety of life experiences, the judge’s participa-
tion in continuing education and self-study dealing with child
development, information derived from mental health experts
who have testified in the court, tradition and precedents from
the legal system, and many other possible sources.  Given the
results of the present study, indicating that judges’ attitudes
about custody issues may vary depending on their generation
and previous experiences, it may be worthwhile for all judges
dealing with these types of cases to examine their own assump-
tions and determine how these assumptions relate to current
sources of information and research on this topic.
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